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1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is founded in this court pursuant to the Utah Administrative Procedures
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-14 and 16 (1987) (UAPA), Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-801 (8)
(2003), Utah Code. Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (2001), and Rule 14(a), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. This matter involves a final agency decision of the Utah Labor Commission
Appeals Board.
ISSUES AND STANDARD FOR REVIEW
There are essentially two issues for resolution on appeal.
A. Issues on appeal.
1.

Did Alexander's accident arise out of his County employment while he was

transporting his wife to her place of employment?
2.

Was Alexander involved in a compensable industrial accident the time of his

automobile accident or did he fall within the coming-and-going rule precluding his recovery?
B.

Applicable Standard of Review.

In reviewing these issues under UAPA, this Court must determine if the County was
substantially prejudiced by the agency's decision, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-16(4) (1997),
and that the error was not harmless. Alta Pacific Associates. Ltd. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n.
931 P.2d 103, 116 (UT 1997). Where the agency has not been granted discretion in
interpreting statutory language, this Court applies a correction-of-error standard, giving no
deference to the agency's ruling. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-16(4)(d); King v. Industrial
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Comm'n. 850 P.2d 1281.1286(UTApp. 1993). When reviewing the legal effect of specific
facts, the court gives no deference to the lower court's ruling. Drake v. Industrial Comm'n,
939 P.2d 177, 181 (UT 1997). Mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed for
reasonableness and rationality. Acosta v. Labor Comm'n. 2002 UT App. 67, 44 P.3d 819
cert, denied 48 P3d 979 (UT 2002).
C. Preservation of issues.
The issues presented for appeal were preserved in the Answer to the Application for
Hearing (R. 10) and in the Motion for Review filed by Salt Lake County (R. 92-108).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The Utah Worker's Compensation Act, Utah Code. Ann. § 34A-2-101 et seq., governs
compensation for industrially-related injuries. Specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401
(1999), provides:
(1) An employee...who is injured...by accident arising out of and in the
course of the employee's employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the
accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid:
(a) compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury or
death;
(b) the amount provided in this chapter for:
(i) medical, nurse, and hospital services;
(ii) medicines...
(2) The responsibility for compensation and payment of medical, nursing,
and hospital services and medicines...provided under this chapter shall be:
(a) on the employer and the employer's insurance carrier; and
(b) not on the employee
An employee's injuries incurred while commuting to and from work are generally
considered not to arise "out of and in the course of the employee's employment." Soldier
2

Creek Coal Co. v. Bailey. 709 P.2d 1165,1166 (UT 1985). Compensability depends upon
which party-the employee or the employer-received the predominant benefit from the travel.
VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Comm'n. 901 P.2d 281,284 (Utah App. 1995).
STATEMENT OF CASE
On February 22, 2005, the administrative law judge entered Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order that Alexander suffered an "accident arising out of and in the
course of his employment." (R. at 88). The ALJ ruled that Alexander at the time of the
accident was providing a substantial benefit to the County when he was both on and off duty
by his operation of his vehicle, and that the County "had substantial control" over
Alexander's operation of that vehicle. (Id.). As a result, the ALJ ordered the County to pay
the statutory benefits.
The County timely filed a Motion for Review on March 21, 2005 (Tr. 92-108).
On February 13, 2006, the Utah Labor Commission Appeals Board, in a two-to-one
decision, issued its Order Denying Review. (R. at 174-179). It concluded that the County
"received the predominate benefit from his (Alexander's) travel" and that the injury was
compensable. (Id. at 176). The dissent found that Alexander received the predominate
benefit of the travel in which he was engaged at the time of the accident and that he did not
suffer an industrial injury. (Id. at 177).
On November 7, 2001, Steven A. Alexander was employed with the Salt Lake
County Sheriffs Office (Application, R. 1; Tr. 181 at 25). His office was located at 3365
3

South 900 West in South Salt Lake City (Tr. 181 at 24,72,74), and he would work from 8:00
a.m. to 5:00 p.m. (Tr. 181 at 59) in an administrative capacity. (Tr. 181 at 58-59). The
County paid him based on the number of hours worked. (Tr. 181 at 59-61). He usually
worked forty hours each week. (Tr. 181 at 26). Work in excess of forty hours had to be
preauthorized and was paid at an over time rate of time-and-one-half. (Tr. 181 Id. at 59).
If he worked less than forty hours in a given week, the missing hours were deducted from his
paycheck. (Tr. 181 at 59-61; County Policy 2-5-03.03, R. at 34-35).
On the day of the accident, he was driving a County-owned Ford Explorer. (Tr. 181
at 28). He was dressed in civilian clothing at that time. (Tr. 181 at 72). The Explorer was
not marked as a police vehicle (Tr. 181 at 61), and it was not bearing "EX" plates identifying
it as a government vehicle. (Tr. 181 at 62). The Explorer carried no external markings
identifying it as a Sheriffs Office vehicle. (Tr. 181 at 61-62). The accident occurred at
approximately 7:45 a.m. (Tr. 181 at 74) and at approximately 1-15 and 12300 South in Salt
Lake County. (Tr. 181 at 28). Earlier that morning, Alexander had left his residence at 4165
South 2700 West in West Valley City (Tr. 181 at 24) and he had been helping his wife
perform her job duties because she had lost fifty percent of her vision in at least one eye and
could not drive. (Tr. 181 at 28-29). He had taken her to approximately 1-15 and the
Bangerter Highway for her completion of some her duties on behalf of her employer, NAC.
(Tr. 181 at 29). At the time of the automobile accident, he was taking her to her employer's
main office at 3rd West and 5th South in Salt Lake City. (Tr. 181 at 35, 72-73). He intended
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to drop her off at her work and then report to his office. (Tr. 181 at 35). At the time of the
accident, he had approximately fifteen minutes to drive twenty-two miles from the accident
site to his wife's work in downtown Salt Lake City, and then to double-back to South Salt
Lake to report for work at his office. (Tr. 181 at 35).
At the time of the accident, Alexander understood that Sheriffs Office policy
excluded travel to and from the office as compensable or as time worked. (County Policy
2-5-03.03(l)(4), R. at 35; Tr. 181 at 68). The policy required Alexander to monitor radio
traffic, but he could only officially respond if "in the vicinity of an in progress crime or other
emergency" (Policy 2-8-02.04(6) (R. at 38)), and he was precluded from responding while
transporting non-peace officer passengers. (Id.).
Alexander understood that the Sheriffs Office policy did not compensate for travel
time and that off-duty deputies who responded to an in-progress event could "then become
on duty "and be compensated. (Tr. 181 at 71-72).
At the time and place of the accident, Alexander's vehicle was equipped with internal
emergency lights, but they had not been activated prior to the collision. (Tr. 181 at 64).
Alexander only contacted dispatch after the accident had occurred and his wife had suffered
serious injuries. (Tr. 181 at 30-32).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
At the time of this accident, Alexander was northbound on 1-15 at approximately
12300 South in Salt Lake County at approximately 7:45 a.m. in the middle of rush-hour
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traffic. He was in an unmarked car, wearing civilian clothes, and helping his wife perform
her duties as an employee of NAC. They were engaged in personal chores in an unmarked
vehicle and they were no different from the thousands of commuters enduring Salt Lake
County rush-hour traffic in their drive to work. Alexander was not on duty or about to be.
He was on a personal errand for his wife and himself-taking her to her job sites in the County
and then transporting her to her office for work. While engaged in this personal errand, he
effectively had removed himself and his vehicle and equipment from performing Sheriffs
Office work. He was in rush-hour traffic at the sound end of the County and could not have
shown up for work on time at his South Salt Lake office. Becaiuse his wife 's vision was so
impaired that she could not drive and she was sitting next to him, he could not have
responded to any police emergency or in-progress crime for at least two reasons. Sheriffs
Office policy prohibited his responding with a civilian passenger. Second, he could not and
would not have dropped off his visually-impaired wife at the side of the freeway or on some
arterial street while he pursued Sheriffs Office business. The only connection with the
Sheriffs Office that Alexander had at the time of the accident was that he was occupying a
Sheriffs Office vehicle.
The Commission extended coverage to Alexander even though at the time of his
injury he was dressed as a civilian, he was driving a vehicle outwardly no different from the
thousands of commuters on the freeway with him, he was not engaged in any Sheriffs Office
police work, he was helping his wife in performing her work assignments, he was not on-
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duty at his office, he was not being paid, and he was transporting a civilian passenger whose
presence prohibited him from responding to any police emergency. The Commission has
carved out a new exception to the "coming-and-going rule," in effect ruling that police
officers' injuries arising from automobile accidents involving an agency vehicle are sustained
"in an accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment."

l

The

Commission's ruling ignores the long line of cases from Utah courts recognizing and
applying the coming-and-going rule precluding worker's compensation benefits for
employees traveling to and from their employment. The Commission's ruling presents
serious liability exposure for any employer who allows any employee to operate a work
vehicle, no matter on how limited a basis, on personal errands as long as the employee
monitors the radio (or listens for the cell phone's ring) or carries work equipment or keeps
a utility uniform on board, even, for example, when transporting his child and team mates
to a game, and regardless of the employee's testimony that he was not engaged in workrelated activity at the time of injury.
The Commission's misapplication of the "coming-and-going" rule of law should be
reversed for a number of reasons. No where in the Worker's Compensation Act has the
legislature carved out such an exception to the "coming-and-going" rule. No Utah appellate

*See Salt Lake City Corp. v. Labor Commission of Utah. Court of Appeals Case No.
0005-0774CA, in which the Commission extended benefits to a Salt Lake City police officer
involved in an accident with an agency vehicle near Tooele County while she was off duty,
transporting herself and her infant son to their residence in Tooele, and not engaged in police
work.
7

case has recognized such an exception either. Utah has not atbandoned the "coming-andgoing" rule. If a "police vehicle" exception is to be recognized, it must come from
legislation, not from the Commission's actions.
ARGUMENT
A. Facts Supporting the Commission's Ruling.
The Appeal Board's findings supporting its decision are set forth pursuant to Utah R.
App. P. 24(a)(9). Alexander was a lieutenant with the County Sheriffs Office. (Tr. 181 at
25-26, 58). He had, on other occasions, responded to calls when he was off duty and had
issued citations. (Tr. 181 at 34). He was on call day and night, seven days a week, for the
investigation of homicides and major crimes.

(Tr. 181 at 27). Under County policy,

vehicles were issued to officers "for use in the performance of their duties." (Policy 2-801.00(1), R. 36). Limited personal use of the vehicles was allowed. (Policy 2-8-02.04(6),
R. 37; Tr. 181 at 35, 70-71). The County provided for the fuel and maintenance for the
vehicle. (Policy 2-8-02.02, R. at36;Tr. 181 at 71,75). Alexander was monitoring the police
radio. (Policy 2-8-02.04(6), R. at 38). Alexander's vehicle was carrying a Ml6 rifle,
shotgun, and Sheriffs Office jacket. (Tr. 181 at 31, 33-34). His presence provided a "cop
on a street." (Tr. 181at 34-35). The County controlled Alexander's use of the vehicle by
requiring him to monitor the radio (Policy 2-8-02.04(6), R. at 38); wash the vehicle (Policy
2-8-02.03, R. at 36; 175); and carry firearms, police identification, citation book, flares, and
a (utility) uniform. (Policy 2-8-02.04(4), R. at 37). He could not operate the vehicle outside

8

of the County without authorization (Policy 2-8-02.04(2), R. at 37); drive the vehicle if the
occupants had consumed alcohol; transport alcohol except in connection with police
matters; or engage the vehicle in activities manifestly inconsistent with the obligation to
respond to an emergency; or allow non-Sheriffs personnel to operate the vehicle. (Id.). The
policy directed that officers not dress in such a way as to discredit the agency (restricting the
wearing of tank tops, reversed baseball caps, earrings, day old beards). (Id.). The vehicle
had no external police markings, but was fully equipped as a police car with siren, radio, and
internal police lights. (Tr. 181 at 61-62,63,64,65,66-67; Exhibits 2-11, photographs, R. at
33). The County benefitted from the increase of the officers on the streets, faster response
times, and increased police availability. (Appellant cannot locate evidence in the record for
this finding at R. at 175). There were circumstances when the County would have benefitted
from having an unmarked car on the road. (Appellant cannot locate evidence in the record
on this point at R. at 175).
B. Discussion.
POINT I. ALEXANDER'S ACCIDENT DID NOT "ARISE OUT AND IN
THE COURSE OF" HIS EMPLOYMENT WITH THE SHERIFF'S OFFICE
BUT WHILE HE WAS ENGAGED IN PERSONAL ERRANDS WITH HIS
WIFE.
Utah Code Annotated §34A-2-401(1999), extends compensation when an employee's
injuries occur "... by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's
employment..." While the law is liberal in extending employees benefits under the Worker's
Compensation Act, the statute's two-pronged test requires that the employee demonstrate a
sufficient nexus between the conduct that produced the claimed injury and employment.
9

Alexander must show, by a preponderance of evidence, that his injuries "occurred in
the course o f his employment and that the injuries "arose out o f that employment. Walls
v. Industrial Comm'n. 857 P.2d 964,967 (UT App. 1993) (citations and quotations omitted).
This court recognized that the term "in the course o f refers to the time, place, and
circumstances under which an injury occurred, as fleshed out by the Supreme Court in M&K
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n. 189 P.2d 132, 134 (UT 1948):
[T]he requirement that the accident arise in the course of the employment
is satisfied if it occurs while the employee is rendering service to his
employer which he was hired to do or doing something incidental
thereto, at the time when and the place where he was authorized to render
such service.
Walls, supra at 967 (citations omitted). This court further concluded:
Thus, an injury occurs "in the course o f employment when it takes place
(1) within the period of employment, (2) at a place where the employee
reasonably maybe in the performance of her duties, and (3) while she is
fulfilling those duties or engaged in doing something incidental thereto.
82 AmJur.2d Workers' Compensation $ 266 (1992): see also 1 Arthur
Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 14.00 (1993) ("The course of
employment requirement... demands that the injury be shown to have
arisen within the time and space boundaries of the employment, and in
the course of an activity whose purpose is related to the employment.")...
Walls, supra, (emphasis in original).
An employee's claim must satisfy all three criteria when seeking compensation. (Id.
at 967-968). In Walls, this court rejected the employee's claim of compensable injury when
she attempted to replace an empty keg after her shift had ended and she had remained at the
bar to socialize, because she did not meet the three criteria to trigger coverage, even though
the injury occurred at the place of her employment and involved an activity she generally
10

performed as an employee. The court found determinative that she was not on shift, she had
remained on the premises to socialize, and her predominate motivation and purpose for her
activities was social. (Id. at 968-967). Similarly, Alexander cannot meet any of the three
criteria. He had not reported for duty. (Tr. 181 at 24, 59, 72, 74). He was not at his duty
station, nor could he have been as scheduled. (Id.). And, his activities and main motivation
for being on the freeway at the place and time of his accident were to complete personal
errands for his wife, not for the Sheriffs Office. His injuries did not occur "in the course o f
his work.
The requirement that an injury "arises out of," mandates a causal connection between
the injury and the employment. Buczynski v. Industrial Comm'n. 934 P.2d 1169,1172 (UT
App. 1997) (rejecting employee's contention under continuous coverage doctrine that slip
and fall at hotel hot tub two days prior to giving her employment-related presentation was
not applicable as employee was engaged in personal diversion at time of accident and her
injury did not occur in the course of employment).
In the case at bar, Alexander's performance of his marital duty of driving his wife
about the valley to fulfill her employer's requirements, while admirable, demonstrates that
his injuries did not arise while he was performing some employment-related task for his own
employer. The fact that the radio was on and he may have been monitoring dispatch does not
change the result, since the predominant motivation and purpose of his presence on the
freeway was serving his own personal interest. See Martinson v. W-M Ins. Agency. Inc..
606 P.2d 256, 258 (UT 1980) (upholding Commission's denial of benefits for employee's
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automobile accident injuries sustained during combined business-pleasure trip as the
predominate purpose was for personal pleasure). In fact, Alexander testified that his only
intent and purpose for being on the road at the time and place of the accident was to help his
wife satisfy her employment obligations, then drive her to her office to report for work, and
then drive to his duty station. (Tr. 181 at 73-74). There is no connection between the
automobile accident in which Alexander was involved and his own job. He was not engaged
in an employment-related risk that caused his injury. Rather he was engaged in the same risk
to which his wife and thousands of civilian commuters were exposed during rush-hour
traffic. The cause of his injuries was not his employment but his personal life.
Salt Lake County's position is not unique. Although no Utah Court case has
considered a closely-analogous fact situation, other states courts have fielded this issue.2 In
Westberrv v. Town of Cape Elizabeth. 492 A.2d. 888 (Sup. Jud. Ct. of Maine 1985), the
court denied benefits to an officer injured while driving home from work, even though he
was wearing his police uniform, he was armed, and he was "technically on call twenty-four
hours per day." (Id. at 889-890). The court concluded that the officer was not injured within
the course of his employment even though he was on call twenty-four hours per day and he
was injured on a street normally within his employer's jurisdiction. (Id. at 890-891). See
also City of Louisville v. Brown. 707 S.W. 2d 346 (Ct. of App. Kentucky 1986) (reversing
award to off-duty officer directing traffic at school as injury not incurred in pursuit of her

2

The county does not assert that this list has exhausted state law from other jurisdictions
on this issue.
12

employment even though she was wearing her uniform and using a police vehicle with
emergency lights running, and rejecting her contention that by directing traffic she was
rendering a beneficial service to her department); and Lawson v. City of Kansas. 918 P.2d
653 (Ct. App. Kansas 1996) (reversing award of benefits to officer injured in altercation at
sports bar finding that officer's injuries arose out of his employment, but not in the course
of his duties, and rejecting as irrelevant applicant's authority to act as a police officer even
though applicant had warned his assailant that he was a police officer before being
assaulted). In both of these cases, there were clear visual or oral indicia of the worker's lawenforcement status when injured, yet

the courts found insufficient connections to

employment to trigger coverage. Alexander's case is even weaker. There was nothing in his
personal appearance or in the appearance of his vehicle, and nothing in his activities,
demonstrating to the public that he was anything more than another freeway commuter.
In City of North Bay Village v. Millerick. 721 S.2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), the
court evaluated a case much closer to a finding of compensability than Alexander has
presented in the case at bar. Millerick was a sergeant with the North Bay Village Police
Department and went out to socialize and drink one evening after his shift had ended.
During the evening he encountered a woman who had given him information leading to the
arrest of a drug suspect. He spoke with her and neglected to tell her that the suspect had been
arrested. She left, telling him that she was going to another bar, and he decided to locate her
to give her this information. He visited other bars attempting to locate her and struck up a
conversation with another suspect while visiting a known drug hangout. That suspect was
13

provoked by Millerick and who then struck Millerick and announced to the bar patrons that
Millerick was a police officer.
Millerick then left the bar and was challenged by two men, whom he thought were
drug dealers, entered his vehicle which they attacked, and as he was driving away he crashed
and was injured. (Id. at 1230-1231). The worker's compensation board awarded Millerick
workman's compensation benefits because he had received his injuries while engaged in his
primary duties as a police officer. (Id. at 1231). A Florida statute provided that a police
officer discharging a primary law-enforcement responsibility "shall be deemed to have been
acting in the course of his employment" regardless of the duty status at the time. (Id.).
The Court of Appeals reversed the award, holding that the evidence Millerick was
prepared to discharge his law enforcement duties was not enough to bring him within the
ambit of the statute since his reasons for being out at the bars were primarily social. (Id. at
1231-1232). The court relied on two cases in rejecting Milleiick's claims that his injuries
arose in the course of his employment. In Palm Beach County Sheriffs Office v. Ginn, 570
2.2d 1059 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), the court had held that a deputy sheriffs monitoring of his
police radio and being on call did not render his off- duty injuries compensable as he was not
engaged primarily in his law enforcement duties. In City of Ft Lauderdale v. Abrams, 561
S.2d 1294 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), the court rejected a forensic detective's automobile accident
injury as being work related even though she possessed her crime scene investigation kit and
a police radio at the time. (See Millerick, supra at 1231 for these discussions). See also
Mayor & Alderman of the City of Savannah v. Stevens. 598 S.E. 2d. 456, 457 (Ga. 2004)
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(officer in uniform and involved in automobile accident on way to work not entitled to
compensation as injuries did not "arise out of employment" even though officer on call
twenty-four hours per day and "expected to preserve the peace and enforce the law even
when off duty," as injury did not arise from hazard inherent in police work); and Luna v.
Worker's Compensation. 244 Cal. Rptr. 596 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. Div. 3 1988) (police officer
injured in traffic accident on way to work intending to apprehend speeding suspect and
preserve life and property not sufficient to show injury within work place setting).
The record before this court provides an even thinner framework to support the
compensation award. The record clearly shows that Alexander's intent and conduct were not
even remotely employment related. When an injured worker's own testimony is that he was
not on duty, he was engaged in personal errands, and he intended to continue those personal
errands for the immediate future, and the Commission extends compensation, it is virtually
impossible to contemplate a scenario where compensation would not be extended.
Alexander's only connection to his employment at the time and place of his injury was his
use of the sheriffs vehicle to run personal errands for himself and his wife. At the time and
place of the accident, petitioner was not engaged in his police work, but he was engaged in
the same activity-commuting to work or running errands-that tens of thousands of other
drivers around him were engaged in at rush hour on 1-15. He has not demonstrated a
compensable injury on the record. This court must reject the "police vehicle" exception to
the automatic extension of coverage. The legislature has not extended discretion to the
Commission to change the statutory language by interpretation. The Commission's ruling
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in this case bears no reasonable or rational basis to Alexander's actions or his stated
intentions at the time of his automobile accident.
POINT II. THE "COMING-AND-GOING" RULE PRECLUDES A
FINDING OF A COMPENSABLE ACCIDENT, AS PETITIONER'S
CONDUCT DOES NOT FALL WITHIN AN EXCEPTION, AND HE WAS
ENGAGED IN PERSONAL ERRANDS AT THE TIME OF HIS INJURY.
Even if some causal connection can be made between Alexander's accident and his
employment, his claim is still barred. While the "coming-and-going" rule is not statutorily
created, it is recognized as inherent in analyzing whether an employee's injuries are so
related to his employment that compensation must be extended. As outlined in A. Larson,
Larson's Worker's Compensation, §13.01, at 13-2 (2000) (citations omitted):
On the other hand, while admittedly the employment is the cause of the
worker's journey between home and factory, it is generally taken for
granted that workers' compensation was not intended to protect against
all the perils of that journey. Between these two extremes, a compromise
on the subject of going to and from work has been arrived at, largely by
case law, with a surprising degree of unanimity: for an employee having
fixed hours and place of work, going to and from work is covered only
on the employer's premises.
Under this analysis, employees on their way to or from work are not extended
workman's compensation benefits when injured on such journeys. Utah has accepted this
basic premise. See Higgins v. Industrial Comm'n. 700 P.2d 704, 707 (UT 1985). The fact
that courts have recognized exceptions such as "special errand" or "special hazards" does not
undermine the basic premise that employees injured while traveling to or from work have not
suffered an industrial accident. The reasons underpinning this rule have been reaffirmed in
Drake v. Industrial Comm'n. 939 P.2d 177, 182-183 (UT 1985):
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This general "coming and going" rule arose because, "in most instances,
such an injury is suffered as a consequence of risks and hazards to which
all members of the traveling public are subject rather than risks and
hazards having to do with and originating in the work or business of the
employer." 82 AmJr.2d Workers' Compensations § 296 (1992).
The underlying theme of exceptions to the rule recognizes that the employee's injuries arose
in the performance of a task for the employer, rather than in the performance of a personal
errand. That is, the employee's injury-causing activity was benefitting the employer, rather
than fulfilling the employee's personal desires, thereby triggering compensation.
This theme was applied by the Supreme Court in Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life
Ins. Co.. 801 P.2d 934,937 (UT 1989)3:
The major premise of the "going and coming" rule is that it is unfair to
impose unlimited liability on an employer for conduct of its employees
over which it has no control and from which it derives no benefit.
Therefore, the major focus in determining whether or not the general rule
should apply in a given case is on the benefit the employer receives and
his control over the conduct.
Accord Cross v. Bd. of Review, 824 P.2d 202,1204 (UT App. 1992); VanLeewen. supra.
Vanleeuwen is particularly instructive to the case at bar. There, the claimant was
driving his employer-owned truck to work from his home. (901 P.2d at 283). He was a
project supervisor, responsible for supervising other employees and transporting them to job
sites. (Id.). The court rejected coverage, holding that the employee's arrival at work and his

3

See Ahlstrom v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2002 UT 4, para 9, 73 P.3d 315, fact that
employer receives some benefit or exercises some control over employee insufficient to remove
employee from the "coming and going" rule. The County acknowledges that these cases
involved third-party liability issues rather than worker's compensation coverages. The fact
remains that there is no rational basis for reaching different resultsfromthe same facts depending
upon which liability issue is under consideration.
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use of the company vehicle did not provide substantial benefits to his employer so as to
trigger coverage. (Id. at 285). The court found important that the employee was not
performing any employment-related services at the time of his injuries and that "The risk that
caused the accident was one common to the traveling public and was not created by duties
connected with his employment." (Id.), (citation omitted). See also Black v. McDonald's
ofLayton, 733 P.2d 154 (UT 1987) (no coverage for automobile accident when employees
traveling to company-sponsored softball game injured in automobile accident).
And in Drake, supra, the court refused compensation for an employee's injuries she
sustained in an automobile accident after she had delivered documents for her employer, an
errand she regularly performed after work two to three times per week. The court held that
once she dropped off the documents and was en route to pick up her children, her claim was
barred by the "coming-and-going" rule. (Id. at 184). The court extended no deference to the
agency's analysis because the review involved the application of the law to the facts. (Id.
at 181).
At the time and place of this accident, Alexander was doing no more than
contemplating driving to his duty station after he had completed his personal errands for his
wife. He projected no law-enforcement presence on 1-15 through his attire, his civilian
wife's presence in the vehicle, or his unmarked vehicle. He was not responding to any
police-related call. He could not have responded to an in-progress crime or other emergency
under the Sheriffs policy or from a practical point of view with his visually-impaired wife
on board. He was not engaged in any general police work. He had no intent to engage in any
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employment-related activity until he had completed his chores. He was too far away from
his duty station to have gone on duty as scheduled. He was not being paid and he had no
expectation of being paid for off-duty travel. The record is devoid of evidence that his
presence at the time and place of the accident was benefitting the Sheriff. The Sheriff was
not controlling Alexander's location, route of travel, or the performance of his personal
errands at the time of the accident. Indeed his employer had no knowledge of Alexander's
activities until he contacted dispatch after the accident had occurred. (Tr. 181 at 30).
At the time and place of the accident, Alexander was neither performing his law
enforcement duties nor engaging in activities so connected with his employment as to be an
essential part thereof. See Barney v. Industrial Comm'n. 506 P.2d 1271 (UT 1973) (internal
citations and quotations omitted). The only connection to the County in this case was that
Mr. and Mrs. Alexander occupied a County vehicle.

Indeed, Mrs. Alexander suffered

serious injuries in this accident. She sustained those injuries not from the risks of Mr.
Alexander's work but from the same risks faced by all commuters that morning on 1-15.
CONCLUSION
The legislature accorded no discretion to the Commission to ignore the mandates of
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 that compensation may only be extended for injuries "arising
out of an in the course of the employee's employment." With all due respect to the
Commission, Salt Lake County respectfully submits that the compensation award must be
reversed as it is "not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record' and it is arbitrary and capricious. See UCA 63-46b-16 (4) (g) and (h) (1998). Accord
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Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n. 858 P.2d 1381, 1385 (UT 1993).
The record reveals that at the time and place of his injury he was not engaged in
police work or other service of benefit to the Sheriff. Alexander's primary activities and his
intent for being where he was at the time and place of the accident were to take care of his
spousal responsibilities, not to engage in law enforcement activities. In short, he was no
different from the tens of thousands of civilian vehicles and their civilian occupants on 1-15
that morning commuting to work or running their personal errands, and he was exposed to
no risk greater than those commuters around him.
There is no authority extended to the Commission to create a "police vehicle"
exception to the "coming-and-going" rule. This court is not obligated to extend deference
to the Commission's ruling on the application of law. Therefore, Salt Lake County requests
that this court reverse the Commission's order awarding compensation and direct it to enter
an order that Alexander's injuries are not industrially related and that his petition be
dismissed.
ADDENDUM
Attached are the following:
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 (1999).

2.

The ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, dated February

22,2005. (R. at 83-91).
3.

The Appeals Board's Order Denying Review, dated February 13,2006. (R. at

174-179).
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ADDENDUM

ADDENDUM

§ 34A-2-401. Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid.
(1) An employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is injured and the
dependents of each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of an in
the course of the employee's employment, whenever such injury occurred, if the
accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid:
(a) compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury or death;
(b) the amount provided in this chapter for:
(i) medical, nurse, and hospital services;
(ii) medicines; and
(iii) in case of death, the amount of funeral expenses.
(2) The responsibility for compensation and payment of medical, nursing, and
hospital services and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under this chapter
shall be:
(a) on the employer an the employer's insurance carrier; and
(b) not on the employee
(3) Payment of benefits provided by this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah
Occupational Disease Act, shall commence within 30 calendar days after any
final award by the commission.

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
ADJUDICATION DIVISION
P.O. Box 146615
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615
TELEPHONE 801-530-6800

STEVEN A. ALEXANDER,

*

Petitioner,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER

*
Case No. 200389

vs.
*

Judge Lorrie Lima

SALT LAKE COUNTY,
*

Respondent.

*
*

The above-entitled matter was heard before Debbie L. Hann, Administrative Law Judge,
Utah Labor Commission, on October 23,2003. The petitioner was represented by Brian Kelm, Esq.
The respondent was represented by John Soltis, Esq. and T.J. Tsakalos, Esq.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The petitioner, Steven A. Alexander, filed an Application for Hearing with the Utah Labor
Commission on January 9, 2003, and claimed entitlement to medical expenses, recommended
medical care, temporary total compensation, permanent partial compensation, travel expenses and
interest. The petitioner's claim for workers compensation benefits arose out of an alleged industrial
accident that occurred on November 7, 2001. The respondent's denied that the accident on
November 7, 2001, arose out of and in the course of the petitioner's employment.
On April 16,2004, Judge Hann issued a Findings of Fact and Interim Order and referred the
issue of medical causation to a Labor Commission medical panel. On August 12,2004, the medical
panel issued a report. A copy of the medical panel's report was mailed to the parties. No party filed
an objection to the report and it is admitted into the evidence pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-2601.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Employment.

The petitioner was employed by the respondent as a deputy sheriff in the Salt Lake County
Sheriff's Office. On November 7, 2001, the petitioner's average weekly wage was $1,338.50. He
was married with one dependent child. The petitioner's weekly workers compensation rate was
$554.00 for temporary total compensation and $369.00 for permanent partial compensation.
2.

Respondent's Policy Regarding Sheriffs Office Vehicles.
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The Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office issued a written policy setting forth regulations
governing vehicles issued to deputy sheriffs. Exhibit R-12. The policy stated in part that:
Travel time will not be counted as time worked. This does not relieve a sworn
employee from an obligation to check on the air or respond to a law enforcement
situation. . . . 2-5-03.03(1 )(4).
**********
Office vehicles and equipment are issued to members for the use in the performance
of their duties. It is the obligation of all members exercising control of these assets to
safeguard them and use them within the limits of policy and good judgement. 2-801.00.
*********

Deputy Sheriffs . . . assigned Sheriff's Office vehicles are subject to the following
restrictions:
(a) Vehicles will not be used for recreational or vacation trips.
(e) Vehicles will not used for activities manifestly inconsistent with the obligation to
respond to emergencies, such as heavy loads, objects protruding from windows
or trunk, etc.
(f) Vehicles may not be used for secondary employment purposes, except as
transportation to and from the work site, except as otherwise authorized by Sheriff's
Office policy. 2-8-02-04(2).
**********

Deputies will carry the following equipment with them in the vehicle at all times:
(a) an authorized firearm.
(b) Sheriff's Office identification.
(c) a flashlight
(d) a Utility Uniform
(e) a citation book and
(f) flares.
2-8-02.04(4).
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**********

When off-duty, deputies may dress appropriate for their activities. If such dress is
inappropriate to represent the Office in an emergency response, the Utility
Uniform will be worn. 2-8-04(5).
**********

When using Sheriff's Office vehicles off-duty, deputies will keep the police radio
on and monitor radio traffic. If in the vicinity of an in-progress crime or other
emergency, the deputy will respond. The deputy will notify Dispatch of such
response. Such responses will be made without non-peace officer passengers.
2-8-02.04(6).
**********

Members are required to wear the seat belt correctly, position themselves
approximately 12 inches back from the steering wheel, and keep hands to the
sides of the steering wheel at the 9 o'clock and 3 o'clock positions. 2-802.05(2)(a).
According to the uncontradicted evidence, the respondent's policy allowed a deputy sheriff to
use the assigned sheriff's vehicle for personal use. The respondent's policy required the deputy
sheriff to monitor the police radio and to respond to police calls, and other situations that required
law enforcement assistance, when operating the vehicle whether or not the deputy sheriff was
officially on duty. The policy required the deputy sheriff to comply with specific safe driving
techniques and vehicle equipment protocol.
3.

November 7, 2001, Accident.

The undisputed facts concerning the motor vehicle accident on November 7,2001, were that
the petitioner and his wife were northbound on 1-15 and 12300 South, in Salt Lake County, in a
sheriffs vehicle issued to the petitioner by the respondent. Earlier that day, the petitioner had driven
his wife to a medical appointment and he was driving her to work in Salt Lake City. The petitioner
intended to drive to his workplace after dropping his wife off at her work. On route to Salt Lake City,
on 1-15, the petitioner stopped his vehicle due to slow traffic. The petitioner observed the driver
behind him would not be able to stop in time to avoid colliding with the rear end of his sheriff's
vehicle. The petitioner removed his right hand from the steering wheel and placed it in front of his
wife so that she would not hit the dashboard. The petitioner maintained his left hand on the steering
wheel and he braced himself. Following the impact, the petitioner's wife was unconscious and nonresponsive. The petitioner called for an ambulance on the sheriff's vehicle's radio.
On November 7, 2001, the sheriff's vehicle assigned to the petitioner was equipped with a
police radio that turned on automatically when the ignition was started. The petitioner selected the
radio frequency for the area in which he was driving, south Salt Lake County, and he monitored the
radio traffic. The petitioner transported in the vehicle a loaded M-16 rifle, 12 gauge shot gun and
side arm. The petitioner was dressed in his work clothes (the petitioner was not a uniformed deputy)
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and he had his sheriff's office jacket and badge. The sheriff's vehicle was unmarked, it had a siren
and forward and back deck lights.
4.

Petitioner's Preexisting Right Shoulder Injury.

The petitioner received treatment for right shoulder pain and decreased range of motion prior
to the November 1,2001, motor vehicle accident. On December 21,2000, Dr. Charles Beck noted
the petitioner complained of a deep ache in his shoulder with radiation into his thumb that began
when he was exercising two months earlier and he felt a pop in his shoulder. X-rays of the
petitioner's shoulder revealed a type III acromion with a five to eight mm hook and spurring of the
glenohumeral space but no significant narrowing with osteoarthritic changes of the AC joint. The
petitioner was given an injection. He had rapid improvement of his shoulder to near normal strength
and motion and he was assigned a rotator cuff strengthening program. Medical exhibit 308.
On February 6, 2001, the petitioner reported shoulder improvement but he complained of
pain. The petitioner reported that, at times, the physical therapy increased his symptoms. Dr. Beck
reported the petitioner had an improved range of motion although his impression was a probable
rotator cuff tear. Dr. Beck noted the petitioner could not have a MRI scan because of a steel
fragment in his eye. Dr. Beck recommended the petitioner have shoulder therapy but he deferred it
as his wife was recovering from knee surgery. Dr. Beck recommended the petitioner continue his
home exercise program and seek follow up medical treatment if his symptoms worsened. Medical
exhibit 310.
5.

Petitioner's Injury Sustained in November 1, 2001, Accident.

The petitioner's right shoulder began to hurt after the collision. Following the motor vehicle
accident, the petitioner's wife had stroke like symptoms caused by a tear in her brain stem. The
petitioner's wife underwent considerable medical treatment. During this period, the petitioner did not
seek medical attention for his shoulder as he was busy caring for his wife and assisting in her
medical treatment. The petitioner timely reported the motor vehicle accident to the respondent and
his sore shoulder.
On March 5, 2002, the petitioner received medical treatment from Dr. Beck for continued
pain in his right shoulder. Dr. Beck noted the petitioner's shoulder was weak and had a guarded
range of motion. The petitioner underwent surgery the next day, March 6, 2002. Medical exhibit
310. The petitioner's post-operative diagnosis was a right rotator cuff tear and adhesive capsulitis.
The indications for the petitioner's surgery included an injury to his shoulder several months earlier
while doing bar dips with decreased strength and range of motion and pain. Medical exhibit 312.
On March 12, 2002, Dr. Beck opined the petitioner's symptoms worsened after the motor
vehicle accident in November 2001. Dr. Beck further opined, although the petitioner's shoulder
condition had improved with the steroid injection, the car accident "...apparently kicked off adhesive
capsulitis and partially tore his rotator cuff, resulting in the present surgery. Prior to that the
petitioner had only mild to moderate symptoms from impingement...." Medical exhibit 310.
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Dr. Beck released the petitioner to light duty on July 23, 2002, and he determined that the
petitioner was medically stable on February 11,2003. Medical exhibit 321 and 329. On June 30,
2003, Dr. Beck assigned to the petitioner's right shoulder a four percent whole person impairment
rating. Dr. Beck apportioned 50% of the petitioner's impairment to his pre-existing condition, or two
percent whole person, and two percent whole person due to the November 2001, motor vehicle
accident. Medical exhibit 331.
In a September 17, 2002, letter to Salt Lake County Risk Management, Dr. Beck noted the
petitioner's right shoulder symptoms significantly worsened following the November 2001, motor
vehicle accident. He opined that at least 50% of the petitioner's right shoulder condition was the
result of the accident. Medical exhibit 325-326.
On September 22,2003, Dr. Richard Knoebel conducted an independent medical evaluation
of the petitioner. Dr. Knoebel opined the petitioner's November 7,2001, motor vehicle accident was
not the cause of his right shoulder condition. Dr. Knoebel based his opinion, in part, on the
petitioner's delay in seeking medical treatment following the accident. Dr. Knoebel assigned to the
petitioner's right shoulder a five percent upper extremity impairment rating. Medical exhibit 358-370.
On October 14,2003, Dr. Ronald Ruff performed a review of the petitioner's medical records
for the respondent. Dr. Ruff noted that "...it is impossible to say that these shoulder problems were
not exacerbated by the accidents." Medical exhibit 356.
On June 2, 2004, the Labor Commission medical panel opined that, in terms of
reasonable medical probability, there was a medically demonstrable causal connection between
the petitioner's right shoulder condition and the motor vehicle accident on November 7, 2001.
The medical panel further opined the treatment the petitioner received for his right shoulder
condition since November 7, 2001, was reasonable and necessary to treat his injury due to the
motor vehicle accident. The medical panel assessed to the petitioner's right shoulder condition
a five percent permanent physical impairment rating. It apportioned two percent whole person,
of the impairment rating, to the petitioner's pre-existing condition and three percent whole person
to the November 7, 2001, motor vehicle accident. The medical panel concluded that the
petitioner was not malingering and he had a normal mental status.
6.

Temporary Total Compensation.

It is undisputed that the petitioner missed work due to his right shoulder condition. The
petitioner had right shoulder surgery on March 6, 2002, and he returned to work on August 6,
2002.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The November 7, 2001, Accident and Scope of Employment

Section 34A-2-401(1) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides that an employee
who is injured by accident "arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment... shall
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be paid compensation." Travel to and from work is not generally considered to be "in the course of.
. . employment." Soldier Creek Coal Co. v. Bailey, 709 P.2d 1165 (Utah 1985).
In Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co., the Court of Appeals cited the Utah
Supreme Court and held:
The major premise of the going and coming rule is that it is unfair to impose
unlimited liability on an employer for conduct of its employees over which it has not
control and from which it derives no benefit. Therefore, the major focus in
determining whether or not the general rule should apply in a given case is on the
benefit the employer receives and his control over the conduct.
In the present case, the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates the respondent's
policy imposed substantial control and obligation on the petitioner both on and off duty. Although
the policy allowed the petitioner to use his assigned sheriff's vehicle when off-duty, he could not use
it for recreational or vacation trips or secondary employment, other than to and from the work site.
The policy required the petitioner to monitor the police radio when operating the vehicle and respond
to a law enforcement situation even if he was not on duty. On the day of the motor vehicle accident,
the petitioner was dressed for work and he carried the mandated sheriff's equipment in the vehicle.
The petitioner operated the vehicle as the policy proscribed including monitoring the sheriff's radio in
the areas he traveled. Finally, the petitioner provided a visual law enforcement presence in the local
community. The sheriff's vehicle was an instrumentality of the Sheriff's Office at all hours of the day
and night when the petitioner operated it. Thus, the petitioner was performing for his employer a
substantial sen/ice required by the respondent's policy.
Based on the foregoing, the petitioner suffered an accident arising out of and in the course of
his employment. The benefit the petitioner provided to the respondent was substantial both on and
off duty when he operated his assigned sheriff's vehicle. Furthermore, the respondent had
substantial control in the manner in which the petitioner operated the sheriffs vehicle both on and off
duty.
2.

Medical Causation of Petitioner's Right Shoulder Condition.

The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the petitioner sustained a preexisting
injury to his right shoulder in fall 2000, for which he received medical treatment. Therefore, the
petitioner is held to a higher legal standard under Allen v. Industrial Commission.
The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that on November 7,2001, the petitioner
was involved in a severe industrial accident when sheriff's vehicle that he was driving was rear
ended on a freeway. A medical demonstrable causal connection existed between the petitioner's
right shoulder condition and the industrial accident on November 7, 2001. The medical treatment
the petitioner received for his right shoulder condition since November 7,2001, was reasonable and
necessary to treat his right shoulder condition due to the industrial accident.
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Based on the foregoing, the petitioner suffered an injury that was caused by an industrial
accident on November 7, 2001.
3.

Temporary Total Compensation.

The petitioner missed a total of 21.6 weeks of work due to the industrial injury he sustained
on November 7, 2001.
4.

Permanent Partial Compensation.

The preponderance of the evidence, based on an impartial medical panel, demonstrates that
the petitioner suffered a five percent whole person physical impairment of his right shoulder. Two
percent of the five percent whole person rating was apportioned to the petitioner's pre-existing
condition. Three percent of the five percent whole person rating was apportioned to the petitioner's
industrial accident.
5.

Travel Expenses.

The petitioner provided no evidence concerning his travel expenses associated with the
medical treatment for his industrially caused injuries.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondent shall pay the petitioner temporary total
compensation at the rate of $554.00 per week for 21.6 weeks, for a total of $11,966.40, less
attorney's fees to Brian Kelm, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-410. That amount is accrued,
due and payable in a lump sum, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per annum, pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §34A-2-420(3) and Utah Administrative Code, Rule 612-1-5.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent shall pay the petitioner permanent partial
compensation for a three percent impairment rating at the rate of $369.00 per week, for 9.36 weeks,
for a total of $3,453.84, less attorney's fees to Mr. Kelm, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-412.
That amount is accrued, due and payable in a lump sum, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per
annum, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-420(3) and Utah Administrative Code, Rule 612-1-5.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents shall pay all medical expenses reasonably
related to the petitioner's industrial accident of November 7, 2001, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§34A-2-418, and the medical and surgical fee schedule of the Utah Labor Commission, and any
travel allowances hereinafter incurred, pursuant to Utah Administrative Code, Rule 612-2-20, plus
interest at eight percent (8%) per annum, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-420(3) and Utah
Administrative Code, Rule 612-2-13.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents shall pay the statutory attorneys' fees of
$3,084.05, plus twenty percent (20%) of the interest awarded herein, directly to Mr. Kelm pursuant to

Alexander v. Salt Lake County
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
Case No. 200389
Page 8
Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-309 and Utah Administrative Code, Rule 602-2-4. That amount shall be
deducted from the petitioner's award and sent directly to the office of Mr. Kelm.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petitioner's claim for travel expenses is dismissed with
prejudice.
DATED THIS 22nd day of February 2005.
UTAH LABOR C O I ^ S S I O N

LORRlM/IA w
Administrative Law Judge

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review
within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission.
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
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Brian Kelm Esq
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Salt Lake City UT 84111
John P. Soltis
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Salt Lake City UT 84190
T J Tsakalos
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UJAHXABOR COMMISSION
Clerk, Adjudication Division
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APPEALS BOARD
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION

STEVEN A. ALEXANDER,
Petitioner,
vs.

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

SALT LAKE COUNTY,

Case No. 03-0089

Respondent.

Salt Lake County asks the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to review
Administrative Law Judge Lima's award of benefits to Steven A. Alexander under the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated).
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §63-46b-12 and Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3).

BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED

On January 9, 2003, Mr. Alexander filed an application to compel Salt Lake County to pay
workers' compensation benefits for injuries Mr. Alexander suffered in a traffic accident on
November 7,2001. Judge Hann held an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Alexander's claim on October
23, 2003, and referred the medical aspects of the claim to a medical panel. Judge Hann then
resigned from the Commission and Judge Lima assumed responsibility in this matter. On February
22, 2005, after receiving the medical panel's report, Judge Lima issued her decision awarding
benefits to Mr. Alexander.
In its request for review of Judge Lima's decision, Salt Lake County argues that Mr.
Alexander is not entitled to workers' compensation benefits because his injuries did not arise out of
and in the course of his employment.

FINDINGS OF FACT

At the time of his accident, Mr. Alexander was a lieutenant in the Salt Lake County Sheriffs
Office, where he supervised the Detectives Division. He was oncall day and night, seven days a
week, for investigation of homicides and other major crimes. Even when offduty, he was required to
respond to calls, as well as responding to crimes committed in his presence.
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Salt Lake County has adopted a policy under which police vehicles were issued to Mr.
Alexander and other law enforcement officers "for use in the performance of their duties." The
County's policy allowed officers to use their County-owned vehicles for personal travel, subject to
some restrictions discussed below. The County provided all fuel, maintenance and repair for the
vehicles. In return, the County benefited from increased numbers of officers on the streets, faster
response and, in general, increased police availability. There are circumstances when the county
would have benefited from having an unmarked car on the road.
The County controlled officers' use of the County's vehicles in several ways. Officers
were required to: 1) monitor the police radios in their vehicles and respond to law enforcement
situations, whether on-duty or off-duty; 2) keep their cars clean, orderly and properly maintained; 3)
carry firearms, police identification, a uniform, flashlight, citation book, and flares in the vehicle at
all times. Officers were prohibited from: 1) using their vehicles for recreational or vacation trips; 2)
driving their vehicles outside Salt Lake County without prior authorization; 3) using their vehicle if
the officer or any passengers had consumed any alcohol within the previous six hours; 4)
transporting alcohol, except for official business; 5) using the vehicle for any activities inconsistent
with the officer's obligation to respond to emergencies; 6) allowing anyone other than a Sheriffs
Office member to operate the vehicle; 7) dressing "in any way that could bring discredit to the
Sheriffs office, i.e. tank tops, reversed ball caps, earrings, day old beards, etc." Off-duty officers
were permitted to have civilian passengers with them but they were not permitted to respond to
police calls with such passengers in the car.
Mr. Alexander had actually used his County-owned vehicle several times during off-duty
hours to engage in law enforcement activities such as traffic stops and officer back-up.
The accident that gives rise to Mr. Alexander current workers' compensation claim
occurred as he and his wife were traveling to work in the County-owned police vehicle assigned to
Mr. Alexander. Mr. Alexander intended to drop his wife at her place of employment and then drive
to his own work locatoin. The vehicle in question had no external markings as a police vehicle, but
was, nevertheless, fully equipped as a police car, with siren, radio and internal police lights. Mr.
Alexander was operating the vehicle in compliance with all County requirements and restrictions.
As a result of the accident, Mr. Alexander suffered the shoulder injuries for which he now seeks
workers' compensation benefits.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Section 34A-2-401(l) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides medical and
disability benefits to employees injured "by accident arising out of and in the course of
employment." The question presented in this case is whether Mr. Alexander's injury, which
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occurred as he and his wife were driving to work in a County-owned police car, arose out of and in
the course of his employment. Salt Lake County argues that, under the "coming and going" rule,
Mr. Alexander's injuries did not arise out of and in the course of his work and are not compensable
under the workers' compensation system.
As noted above, injuries are only compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act when
they arise out of and in the course of employment. Whether an injury is work-related, and therefore
compensable, depends on the specific facts of each case. As a general rule, injuries sustained while
"coming and going" to work are not considered to arise out of and in the course of employment and
are not compensable. VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Commission, 901 P.2d 281,284 (Utah App. 1995).
However, this "coming and going" rule is not absolute. Among its exceptions are situations where
the employer provides transportation primarily for the employer's own benefit and exercises control
over the use of that transportation. VanLeeuwen at 285. Consequently, in order for the Appeals
Board to determine whether Mr. Alexander's claim is barred by the "coming and going" rule, it is
necessary to consider the degree to which Mr. Alexander's travel was for the County's benefit and
under the County's control.
In evaluating the benefits Salt Lake County received from Mr. Alexander's travel in his
County-owned police car, the Appeals Board notes that such travel was pursuant to a policy
established by the County itself. It is undisputed that the County received substantial benefit from
the policy as a result of greater law enforcement coverage throughout the County. Furthermore, the
County exercised substantial control over vehicle use. Among other things, the officers were
required to cany firearms, I.D. and a uniform, and other equipment. They were required to monitor
and respond to calls and to engage in police action when feasible. All these obligations and
restrictions applied to Mr. Alexander at the time of his accident.
The Appeals Board also notes Salt Lake County's argument that, because Mr. Alexander's
wife was in his County-owned vehicle at the time of the accident, he was precluded from taking
police action and can not be considered in the course of his employment. However, the County's
written policy explicitly permits law enforcement officers to transport passengers, subject only to the
restriction that such passengers cannot be in the car when the officer responds to a law enforcement
situation. The County presented no other evidence on this point, and the Appeals Board cannot
presume that Mrs. Alexander's presence necessarily precluded Mr. Alexander from engaging in law
enforcement action.
While the Appeals Board recognizes that Mr. Alexander also received a substantial personal
benefit from his ability to use a County vehicle for personal use,' the Appeals Board finds that based
on the evidence presented, the County received the predominant benefit from his travel.
Consequently, Mr. Alexander's traffic accident and injury arose out of and in the course of his
employment and is compensable under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
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ORDER
The Appeals Board denies Salt Lake County's motion for review and affirms Judge Lima's
decision. It is so ordered.
Dated this 13

day of February, 2006.

Dissenting Opinion follows on next page

l Joseph E. Hatch having recused himself from consideration of this case, Thomas Lewis has been
desgnated to participate as a member of the Appeals Board pursuant to § 34A-1-303(5) of the Utah
Labor Commission Act.
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DISSENT
I respectfully dissent from the Appeals Board's majority decision. In VanLeeuwen v.
Industrial Commission, 901 P.2d 281,284 (Utah App. 1995), the decision turned on which party, the
employer or the employee, received the predominant benefit from the travel. In my view, the
realities of Mr. Alexander's use of his police vehicle for personal errands and commuting to and
from work establish that he, rather than the County, received the primary benefit. That he was
spared the expense of coming and going to work was a major benefit to him. In contrast, it is
difficult to discern any significant benefit that the County was receiving from Mr. Alexander's offduty travel at the time of his accident. This is particularly true in light of the facts that: a) because of
the administrative nature of his work, he was not in uniform; b) he was driving an unmarked car,
rather than a marked police car; c) he had a civilian (his wife) with him; and d) he was not engaged
in any work-related activity, but was driving his wife to her place of employment. Pursuant to § 2-802.04(6) of Salt Lake County's written policy governing vehicle use, the presence of Mr.
Alexander's wife in Mr. Alexander's vehicle precluded Mr. Alexander from responding to any law
enforcement situation.
"Travel to and from work is not generally considered to be 'in the course of . . .
employment.'" Soldier Creek Coal Co. v. Bailey, 709 P. 2d 1165,1166 (Utah 1985). At the time of
his accident, Mr. Alexander was performing no services for the County. His work responsibilities
neither caused nor contributed to the accident. I see no significant difference between his
circumstances and the circumstances of thousands of other Utah commuters who, under the coming
and going rule, would be denied workers' compensation benefits if they were involved in such an
accident.
Because Mr. Alexander received the predominate benefit from his off-duty use of his patrol
vehicle, I would hold that he is subject to the coming and going rule, and that his accident and
injuries are not compensable under the workers' compensation system.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider this
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days
of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals
by filing a petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the
court within 30 days of the date of this order.

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW
STEVEN A ALEXANDER
PAGE 6

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the matter of
Steven A. Alexander, Case No. 03-0089, was mailed first class postage prepaid this /3 day of
February, 2006, to the following:
Steven A. Alexander
6025 N 5000 W
Delta UT 84624
Salt Lake County
Workers' Comp. Claims
2001 S State St Ste 3400
Salt Lake City UT 84190
Brian Kelm, Esq.
350S400EStel22-W
Salt Lake City UT 84111
T.J. Tsakalos, Esq.
2001 S State St Ste S3400
Salt Lake City UT 84190
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Sara Danielson
Utah Labor Commission

